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Abstract. The current trend to use partitioned architectures in on-
board spacecraft software requires applications running on the same
computer platform to be isolated from each other both in the tempo-
ral and memory domains. Memory isolation techniques currently used in
Integrated Modular Avionics for Aeronautics usually require a Memory
Management Unit (MMU), which is not commonly available in the kind
of processors currently used in the Space domain. Two alternative ap-
proaches are discussed in the paper, based on some features of Ada and
state-of-the art compilation tool-chains. Both approaches provide safe
memory partitioning with less overhead than current IMA techniques.
Some footprint and performance metrics taken on a prototype imple-
mentation of the most flexible approach are included.
Key words: Ravenscar Ada, high-integrity, hard real-time, embedded
systems, integrated modular avionics.
1 Introduction
On-board embedded computers play a crucial role in spacecraft, where they
perform both platform control functions, such as guidance and navigation control
or telemetry and tele-command management, and payload specific functions,
such as instrument control and data acquisition. One distinctive characteristic
of on-board computer systems is that computational resources are scarce, due
to the need to use radiation-hardened hardware chips and also to weight and
power consumption constraints. In this kind of systems, the more computational
resources on-board the higher energy consumption, which in turn results in more
power cells and thus more weight, increasing the total weight and the costs
required to launch the spacecraft. Another key aspect of these systems is the
presence of high-integrity and hard real-time requirements, which raises the need
for a strict verification and validation (V&V) process both at the system and
software levels [1].
⋆ This work has been funded in part by the Spanish Ministry of Education, project
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Current trends envisage systems with increased functionality and complexity.
Such systems are often composed of several applications that may have different
levels of criticality. In such a scenario, the most critical applications must be
isolated from the less critical ones, so that the integrity of the former is not
compromised by failures occurring in the latter. Isolation has often been achieved
by using a federated approach, i.e. by allocating different applications to different
computers. However, the growth in the number of applications and the increasing
processing power of embedded computers foster an integrated approach, in which
several applications may be executed on a single computer platform. In this case,
alternate mechanisms must be put in place in order to isolate applications from
each other. The common approach is to provide a number of logical partitions1 on
each computer platform, in such a way that each partition is allocated a share of
processor time, memory space, and other resources. Partitions are thus isolated
from each other both in the temporal and spatial domains. Temporal isolation
implies that a partition does not use more processor time than allocated, and
spatial isolation means that software running in a partition does not read or
write into memory space allocated to another partition.
This approach has been successfully implemented in the aeronautics domain
by so-called Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [2]. While IMA is industri-
ally supported and effectively provides temporal and spatial isolation, its use
in spacecraft systems raises some problems due to the need of complex com-
puter boards that call for alternative, more flexible solutions. In this context,
Ada 2005 [3] provides a new set of real-time mechanisms that open the way to
new approaches to inter-partition isolation. Some strategies for providing tem-
poral isolation using the new Ada execution-time monitoring mechanisms have
already been developed by the authors [4], and prototype implementations have
been built in the framework of the ASSERT project2 [5].
This paper presents new research directed at providing spatial isolation based
on alternative approaches to current IMA architectures, including features of the
Ada language and operating system-level mechanisms. The basic idea behind
the proposed strategies is to modify the compilation toolchain to make a better
use of the scarce computational resources at run-time. The available hardware
memory protection is still used at run-time, but predictability losses due to
address translation in MMUs are avoided. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 describes the main aspects of the current IMA architectures.
Section 3 introduces some alternative approaches to spatial isolation. Section 4
discusses the architecture of real-time kernels with respect to memory protection,
while section 5 details a set of changes needed in the compilation tool-chain
needed to implement the two new strategies. Finally, section 6 references some
related work, and section 7 summarizes the main conclusions of this paper.
1 Notice that the term partition is not used here in the sense defined in the ALRM
(10.2/2), but as an implementation of protection as specified in the DO-178B (2.3.1).
2 http://www.assert-project.net/
2 Integrated Modular Avionics
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) is a generic term to describe an architec-
ture where different avionics applications are executed independently on a sin-
gle CPU. Applications may have different criticality levels [6], and be logically
distributed on different partitions of the same processor or over a network of
computers connected by a communication link.
In order to support different criticality levels, applications have to be isolated
from each other. Otherwise all the code would have to be certified to the highest
criticality, an extremely expensive (and probably impossible) burden. To this
purpose, each computer node is divided into one or more partitions, each of
which is a virtual container for one or more applications with the same level of
criticality, which are isolated in the time and memory domain from applications
running in other partitions. An important consequence of partitioning is that
applications can be updated individually without requiring re-certification of
the whole system. Figure 1 shows an example of an IMA system.
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Fig. 1. Four applications with different criticality levels executing inside three parti-
tions over the same computing node.
Implementing an IMA architecture requires a specialized operating system
layer that provides temporal and spatial isolation between partitions. The AR-
INC 653 standard [7] defines an architecture for such an operating system. There
are diverse ARINC 653 implementations available from multiple vendors, and
the standard has been successfully used in a number of commercial and military
avionics systems. However, in spite of its success in the aeronautics field, its ap-
plication to spacecraft systems raises some problems. First of all, the partition
scheduling method is too rigid, and does not allow spare processor time to be
re-allocated to other partitions. This may reduce the schedulability of applica-
tions on the comparatively slow processors that are currently used in spacecraft
computers. The other main problem is that current ARINC 653 implementations
require a MMU, which is seldom available on space computers. Indeed, current
processors used by ESA3, such as LEON2 [8], do not have an MMU. Therefore,
other methods not relying on the presence of MMU devices should be explored
in order to implement spatial isolation in spacecraft systems.
3 Approaches to spatial isolation
3.1 Static analysis
SPARK is an Ada-based language designed for high-integrity systems. The lan-
guage is restricted to a safe subset of Ada, augmented with formal annotations
enabling efficient static analysis. A particular kind of annotation refers to the
integrity—or criticality—level of program elements, enabling static analysis of
violations in the criticality segregation [9]. In this way, static information-flow
analysis of source code can be used to guarantee that an application will not
write into the memory space of another application.
In principle this method can provide spatial isolation for a node with appli-
cations with high criticality levels, and it can also be used to ensure fault con-
tainment inside a specific application. However, this approach requires all the
software in a computer node to be programmed in SPARK, a language intended
only for high-criticality applications. Therefore, it is not suitable for the general
case where low-criticality applications, possibly written in other languages, are
present. On the other hand, it is an interesting approach to spatial isolation in
computers which only host highly critical code, and can also be combined with
other methods in a more general situation.
3.2 Run-time checks
A second approach is to use the extensive set of compile-time and run-time
checks provided by the Ada language to detect possible violations of memory
isolation. For example, forbidding using a memory pool in more than one parti-
tion seems a reasonable restriction. Following a similar reasoning, the run-time
system can be designed so that there is a separate secondary stack for each parti-
tion, and an exception is raised in case of overflow. Additional run-time controls
for checking that no task can write outside its partition memory area can also be
implemented, e.g. when using general access objects a check can be made that
the address is inside the partition space, and the same can be done for all access
types if ’Unchecked Access or Unchecked Conversion is allowed.
Wahbe et al [10] proposed a different software technique to avoid writing
outside the memory region of the application called address sandboxing. Some
code is added before dereferencing a pointer which applies a mask to the high
bits of the pointer so that the destination address always falls into the memory
range of the application. Therefore, even if the pointer is incorrect, the mask
3 European Space Agency.
ensures that it will not write outside its memory region. Address sandboxing
does not detect failures, but can be more efficient than run-time checks.
The main problem of these approaches is that they add complexity to the
compiler and run time support, which may make it difficult to certify high-
criticality applications. They can be retained, however, to implement fault con-
tainment regions within a partition.
3.3 Hardware protection
Some kind of hardware memory protection is available on virtually all processors,
usually allowing read and write access, read-only access, or completely hiding a
memory region. In addition, a memory area can be made non-executable, which
is useful if the area contains only data. The memory protection setting cannot
be modified when the processor is in user mode, but only in supervisor mode,
and thus it can only be changed by the operating system. These mechanisms
can thus be used to ensure that applications of mixed criticality can safely run
on the same node. Furthermore, only the operating system must be certified to
the highest criticality level, as it is the only subsystem that deals with memory
protection.
An MMU is not always available in spacecraft computers because it is a com-
plex hardware component with a comparatively high power consumption [11], as
its internal cache for translating addresses, the TLB, is usually fully-associative
and frequently accessed. Moreover, the possibility of TLB misses hinders the
predictability of the system and introduces some overhead due to address trans-
lation and TLB flushes [12]. The complexity of MMU chips also makes them
prone to single event upsets (bit flips due to high-energy particles) [2].
There is another main kind of hardware memory protection mechanism, fence
registers. Fence registers provide a limited functionality, protecting a fixed num-
ber of memory segments of any size. In contrast, an MMU can provide sophis-
ticated memory management schemes, including pagination, segmentation, and
virtual memory. While such schemes are usually required in general-purpose
operating systems, they are of less use in embedded computing, even with repro-
grammability in mind, due to the fact that embedded hard real-time applications
are usually statically loaded at system initialization time, at least in spacecrafts.
For example, the LEON2 processor has a pair of fence registers that can be used
to avoid writings outside the two specified segments of the SRAM.
In this case, there is no hardware relocation, and therefore all applications
share a single address space. Memory reads are always allowed by the fence reg-
isters. This limits their usefulness as a spatial isolation mechanism, as attempts
to read or execute outside the allowed memory area are not detected. In spite of
this limitation, fence registers are a simple and robust mechanism without the
complexity and comparatively high power consumption of MMUs. Two schemes
for implementing spatial isolation based on generic fence registers are described
in the following sections.
4 Kernel architecture
4.1 Architecture of current real-time kernels
The current practice in the space domain is to execute all the embedded software
in supervisor mode, i.e. any application and not only the kernel can execute
privileged instructions. Furthermore, all the code executes inside a single (flat)
memory space, and all the applications are linked statically into a single binary
image, also including the real-time kernel, regardless of their criticality. As shown
in figure 2, all the executable code is linked into a single . text section, the global
variables are located in the .data and .bss sections, and the stack for each thread
is created in the .bss section during initialization.
.bss
stack task 1
stack task n
...
SRAM start
SRAM end
.data
.textexecutable code
global data
initialized
uninit. global data
Fig. 2. Current memory map.
This model has several advantages, like increased CPU performance and
memory footprint reduction. There is no code duplication because all the ap-
plications share the same code, including static libraries. The operating system
can be simpler, e.g. there is no application loader. However, hardware memory
protection cannot be used to provide complete memory isolation because all the
global variables are located in the same section ( .data or . bss), regardless of
their criticality level. Only the task stacks can have some memory protection
because they are clearly separated in memory. ORK, RTEMS, and ThreadX are
examples of real-time kernels currently used in the European space industry that
follow this memory allocation model.
4.2 Needed architectural changes
Some changes to the above scheme are required in order to implement spatial
isolation using fence registers. Specifically, the global data and stacks (and heap,
if available) of each partition must be allocated to separate memory areas, so
that the kernel can provide write permission only to the data area of the partition
of the thread that is currently executing.
An example of a memory map implementing this principle is shown in fig-
ure 3. In this figure, the code and data of each partition (including the kernel) are
grouped into dedicated memory zones. Other schemes are possible, for example
one with all the executable code in an adjacent area, which can be more efficient
as only one segment has to be used for protecting non-executable memory.
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Fig. 3. Memory map for spatial isolation.
It should be noticed that the code shared among partitions is compiled as
shared libraries, i.e. each partition using a specific shared library reserves in
its private data section the space required for the global variables of the shared
library. Otherwise, the code would be duplicated in each partition thus increasing
the memory footprint. In addition, it is worth noting that some free memory
space should be reserved for on-line reprogrammability.
The above schemes show that implementing spatial isolation with fence reg-
ister requires changes not only in the real-time kernel, but in the compilation
and linking process as well. These changes are discussed in the next section.
5 Modifying the compilation toolchain
5.1 Basic considerations
In order to implement a partitioned system, the tasks and global data that are
included in each partition must be identified in the first place. Possible commu-
nication between co-operating applications running on different partitions must
also be analysed. This in turn requires some kind of inter-partition communica-
tion mechanism to be defined.
In the following paragraphs two alternative strategies for developing parti-
tioned systems are explored. The first one is based on building a custom linking
script for the partitioned system, and the second one uses a new tool called
meta-linker. In both cases the compilation model and the linking method that
are used to produce the executable code are modified with respect to the basic
model described in section 4.
5.2 Custom linking script
Compilation model. The current practice when using common compilation
toolchains is to have all applications in the same computer node compiled as
a single Ada program. Spatial isolation can be achieved if all applications are
programmed according to a set of rules that clearly mark the tasks and data
belonging to each application, e.g. using new pragmas or formal annotations.
An ASIS [13] tool can then be used to check the source code and detect possible
problems at a system-wide level and to generate a custom script that is used by
the linker to produce an appropriate memory map (figure 4).
Fig. 4. Approach 1: Custom linking-script.
This approach requires a precise set of Ada rules for partitioning to be de-
fined. Some rules are straightforward, e.g. “tasks belonging to different appli-
cations may not be declared in the same package”, but some others are more
complex, e.g. those on data types transmitted to other applications in order to
avoid cross-partition pointers. Overall, a set of rules similar to the Ada Dis-
tributed Systems Annex (DSA) [3, App. E] can be defined, with the difference
that the run-time system can be shared among all the partitions in the same
computer node.
Protected objects (marked with a specific pragma) can be used for inter-
partition communication (note again footnote 1). Such objects are located in
a specific shared memory region, independent of those allocated to partitions.
However, when the proxy-model implementation of protected objects is used (as
in e.g. GNAT), a task can execute some entry code on behalf of some other task
[14]. This means that the proxy task may need to write some results in a stack
belonging to another partition. One possible solution is to forbid out parameters
in protected entries that are used for inter-partition communication. In this case,
the entry is used only for signalling the arrival of an inter-partition message, and
a protected procedure is then called to read the data.
Linking method. The linker binds each symbol (subprogram or global data)
to a specific memory address [15]. This first approach relies on using an ap-
propriate linking method for partitioning code and data into disjoint memory
areas, in order to be able to take advantage of hardware memory protection.
This approach also requires the kernel to be slightly modified so that it creates
the stack of each thread in the global data area allocated to its partition.
The simplest way to implement this approach is to make an ASIS tool that
checks the programming rules and generates a custom linking script for the
system. The script specifies the location of each piece of data and each memory
stack according to the partition it belongs to. The linker uses this custom script
to generate an executable image with code and data allocated to the specified
areas and symbol resolution (see figure 4).
An important advantage of this strategy is that existing response time anal-
ysis techniques can still be used. However, a new set of complex programming
rules needs to be defined in order to provide partitioning among applications,
and some of them may not be amenable to efficient static checking. In addition,
the tool must support all the programming languages used in the system, which
may be infeasible in some cases.
5.3 Meta-linker
Compilation model. The second strategy for memory isolation is based on
compiling each partition as a separate Ada program, with all its tasks and global
data belonging to that partition. Task priorities are global, i.e. the scheduler
does not have any notion of partitions. On the other hand, no global variables
can be shared among partitions. Hence, a new kernel service for inter-partition
communication, similar to a message queue, has to be implemented. This service
can be specially crafted to be very efficient in CPU time and memory space.
Only one-way communication is needed, so blocking time can be minimized with
respect to intra-partition synchronization primitives. The main requirement is
that inter-partition communications must be predictable so that response time
analysis can still be performed.
The problem with this approach is how to perform application-wide analysis
with applications running in multiple partitions. Since there are no global shared
data, the Ada Distributed Systems Annex can be used as a basis. Notice that the
DSA also supports partition-wide strong typing enforcing by the compiler. The
DSA is designed so that each partition has a separate run-time system. However,
in this case the run-time can be shared among all partitions in order to reduce
memory footprint. Distribution transparency is achieved as any partition can
Fig. 5. Approach 2: Meta-linker.
be moved to another node without source code modification. Therefore Ada
provides all the needed support, and there is no need for language extensions
like new pragmas as in the previous approach.
Linking method. Under this approach each partition is first linked separately,
but relocation information is retained in a linkable output format (e.g. ELF offers
this possibility). Then a new tool called meta-linker finally sets the memory area
of each partition, the kernel, and all shared libraries (including the Standard Ada
Libraries) into a single executable. The data of each partition are bound to a
separate location by the meta-linker so hardware memory protection can be
used, taking into account the size and alignment requirements. The meta-linker
also creates some data structures describing the layout of the partition. This
information is needed by the kernel to adjust the fence registers in each context
switch.
The meta-linker can be seen as an alternative to the address translation
performed by an MMU, although in this case the address translation is performed
statically within the compilation chain. It can be simple enough to be a qualified
tool [6, §12.2], and therefore there is no need to certify again all the partitions
if a change in the size of one of them results in modifying their base addresses.
It is often required that a partition can be independently modified without
a need for re-linking and re-certifying other partitions. This can be done in two
ways. The first one is that the linker resolves all symbols with an arbitrary base
address, retaining all the relocation information for each symbol in the object
code. The meta-linker adjusts the base address of all symbols for each partition at
the time of building the final executable. The alternative is to generate Position
Independent Code (PIC), so that the meta-linker only needs to adjust some
symbols and specific pointers to global data. The problem with the first solution
is that it makes the meta-linker more complex, and it also may require some
changes in the compiler and linker, this making qualification more difficult. On
the other hand, compiling as PIC often leads to larger and slower code, which
may be a problem when computing resources are scarce.
5.4 Prototyping
In order to evaluate performance penalties, a meta-linker prototype and a new
version of GNAT/ORK for LEON (a variant of GNAT4 which uses an evolved
version of the ORK kernel [16]), which can generate PIC, have been built.
The first problem that has been investigated is a potential increase in foot-
print. Preliminary measurements have been taken in order to evaluate the differ-
ences between PIC and non-PIC executables. Compiling both synthetic bench-
marks and real code used in space projects, the increase in the number of in-
structions can be considered tolerable for this type of embedded systems. The
size increase of the executable code ( . text section) has been found to be about
7–15%, and the penalty in the total memory usage is only 1–4%, including also
the data and stack segments, as shown in table 1.
Table 1. Footprint increase of Position Independent Code (PIC)
Executable code Global data Stacks Total
non-PIC PIC non-PIC PIC non-PIC PIC
Benchmark 1 59 KB 67 KB 383 KB 384 KB 220 KB 661 KB 670 KB
Benchmark 2 104 KB 118 KB 385 KB 387 KB 420 KB 908 KB 925 KB
Application 1 439 KB 478 KB 422 KB 429 KB 320 KB 1181 KB 1227 KB
Application 2 1060 KB 1134 KB 599 KB 610 KB 320 KB 1979 KB 2064 KB
Position Independent Code (PIC) also has an execution time penalty when
calling to a function in a shared library or referring to a global variable. As the
linker cannot know where the code will be loaded, non-static routines must be
called via a Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) and two actual jumps are performed
instead of just one as usual. In order to measure the negative impact of on
performance, a set of composite benchmarks and high-level algorithms from the
Performance Issue Working Group (PIWG) test suite were used. Table 2 shows
the results which for the Dhrystone and Whetstone benchmarks, as well as three
complex algorithms. The significant differences are just in the Dhrystone and
Whetstone benchmarks, as the differences in the high level algorithm tests and
other PIWG tests are negligible or even favour PIC.
The most significant difference is in the Dhrystone benchmarks with full op-
timization where the performance penalty of PIC is about 38%. The penalty is
about 21% for this test with no optimization. However, the Dhrystone bench-
mark consists of composite calls to integer routines with a very short execution
time. Conversely, the Whetstone benchmark routines perform floating point cal-
culations with considerably longer execution times. In this cases, the penalty
ranges from 0.5% to 4.5%. Of course, a program calling mostly short routines
will pay a comparatively higher penalty due to extra jumps.
The real situation is likely to be closer to the high level algorithms, where the
maximum penalty is about 12%, and the minimum one is negligible. Therefore,
4 http://www.adacore.com/
Table 2. Comparison in execution time.
No optimization Full optimization
Description non-PIC PIC non-PIC PIC
Dhrystone 91.50 µs 111.52 µs 30.56 µs 41.66 µs
Whetstone manufacturers math routines 228.00 ms 233.50 ms 128.62 ms 131.88 ms
Whetstone with built-in math routines 207.76 ms 208.76 ms 66.68 ms 69.56 ms
NASA Orbit determination 586.00 ms 635.50 ms 281.50 ms 316.50 ms
JIAWG Kalman benchmark 185.76 ms 186.00 ms 20.28 ms 20.18 ms
Tracker centroid algorithm 5.64 ms 5.58 ms 2.08 ms 2.08 ms
it can be said that the penalty of using PIC is acceptable both in footprint and
performance for typical real situations. It must be noticed that using an MMU
approach for spatial isolation also pays a significant performance penalty due to
heavier context switches.
In summary, it can be said the best way to provide spatial isolation based
on fence registers as the only hardware support is the second proposed strategy,
i.e. writing separate source code for each application and compiling and linking
each partition separately, keeping the relocation information. A qualified meta-
linker is then used to examine the sizes of the kernel, the shared libraries, and
the partitions, adjust the base address of the whole application, and generate a
single binary image. Finally, the real-time kernel adjusts the fence registers and
processor mode at run time in order to provide the required strong hardware
memory protection between partitions.
This is an elegant and powerful solution as it enables distributed applications
(e.g. using a specialized DSA implementation) to be written in any programming
language, including Ravenscar Ada and SPARK for high-criticality applications,
or full Ada and C for low-criticality ones. It enables the performance and pre-
dictability problems of an MMU to be avoided, and allows individual partitions
to be modified without having to certify again the whole system.
No modifications are required to current compilers, assemblers, or linkers,
and the meta-linker is designed to be simple enough to be qualified for the de-
velopment of high-integrity software. Furthermore, no extensions are required
to the Ravenscar profile for enabling spatial isolation using the meta-linker ap-
proach. The few and localized additions to the kernel are not expected to hinder
certification, being less complex or at least comparable to the software imple-
mentation support required by an MMU.
6 Related work
The implications of the MMU in Integrated Memory Avionics have also been
studied by Audsley and Bennet [12]. Using SPARK for mixed criticality high-
integrity systems was proposed by Amey and others [9].
The performance penalties with respect to Position Independent Code have
been analysed by several authors. However, measurements comparing PIC and
non-PIC executables for embedded systems are not easy to find. One example
of measurements for general purpose C++ applications is presented by Hamil-
ton [17].
Other industrial domains could take advantage of the proposed techniques for
achieving spatial isolation. For example, Autosar [18] is an automotive standard
with a similar objective as Integrated Modular Avionics. The target CPUs used
in those systems do not usually have an MMU, and therefore the standard does
not consider spatial isolation. However, some of the techniques proposed in this
paper can be a solution to provide memory protection on such systems.
7 Conclusions
Spatial isolation is needed to comply with the requirements of the the next-
generation systems in the aerospace domain. A Memory Management Unit is
commonly used for this purpose in general purpose operating systems, but per-
formance and predictability problems appear when using MMUs in hard real-
time embedded systems. Indeed, processors currently used in the European space
industry an other embedded application domains, only include basic memory
protection mechanisms, such as fence registers.
Several techniques have been explored in order to find a memory isolation
scheme that can be used in this type of systems, most of them taking advantage
of the unique characteristics of the Ada language. The recommended approach
for systems composed only of high-integrity code is to use a safe subset of the lan-
guage, such as SPARK, which also enables the absence of errors to be statically
proved under appropriate conditions.
For systems composed of high- and low-criticality applications, a novel and
powerful solution, involving a separate compilation of each partition, and a quali-
fied meta-linker to generate the final executable, has been proposed. This flexible
approach provides the same features as traditional techniques like strong mem-
ory partitioning, independent certification of partitions and maintenance, but it
requires less hardware functionality and adds less overhead as specific processing
is done statically at build time. Finally, additional Ada run-time checks can be
used to detect programming errors inside each partition. A special-purpose im-
plementation of the Ada Distributed Systems Annex can be used to enable static
program-wide analysis of applications spanning multiple partitions, a character-
istic which is often required for the certification of high-integrity systems.
A meta-linker prototype has been implemented as a proof of concept of the
whole approach. The tool is simple enough to be qualified to a high-integrity
level, and experimental performance and footprint metrics show that there is
not a substantial penalty if the partitions are compiled as Position Independent
Code. No modifications are required to the compiler, assembler or linker.
Future work includes specific compiler modifications to improve the genera-
tion of position independent code for embedded platforms, and research about
how to reduce the impact of processor mode changes in space processors.
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